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I. INTRODUCTION 
Digital computing machines a re  being applied to an ever-expanding set of problems, 
extending from simple arithmetic operations to such exotic tasks as mechanical language 
translation, information retrieval, visual pattern recognition, automatic speech recog- 
nitionand synthesis, theorem proving and playing checkers and chess. It has often 
been pointed out that digital computing machines can do anything which can be described 
in detail with a finite set of instructions. * A general-purpose computer is considered 
a universal machine in the Sense of Turing; it can imitate any other machine. In 
* A s  stated, the quoted assertion is completely false. There a re  certain problems 
which cannot be handled by Turing machines, and thus cannot be expected to be 
handled by digital computers. See section II of this paper. 
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SUMMARY 
This paper considers the basic question of the adequacy of conventional, general- 
purpose digital computers, and whether new, non-conventional machine structures 
would be useful for expanding the capabilities of machine performance, to permit auto- 
matic solution of problems previously handled only by humans. Included in the class 
of l'non-conventionallt machines discussed herein a re  hybrid machines, multiprocessors, 
highly parallel computers, Holland and SOLOMON machines, bionics models, diffused- 
function anastomotic networks, pattern recognition machines, "linguistically intelligent" 
machines, and other more exotic machines. 
Several arguments favoring non-conventional machine structures are presented. 
Considered separately are arguments based on: (a) the opinions of certain experts; 
(b) ultimate theoretical capabilities of various machine types; (c) structures of bio- 
logical counterparts in brains and nervous systems; (d) the potential for natural- 
language programming; (e) relative computational economies and efficiencies; and 
(f) the potential for successful development of new types of computer structures. Such 
arguments demonstrate the problems one can get into by confining study to present- 
day digital computer organizations, and the potential advantages of new, user-oriented 
designs . 
I particular, if the human brain is a machine, a computer with access to sufficient 1 
I memory can then, in principle, imitate the human brain exactly. 
according to this argument, perform the same operations, such as language translation, 
pattern recognition, theorem proving, and the like. 
Hence it can, ' There are,  however, certain strings attached to this prediction [ref. 1, p. 3081 . 
No mention is generally made of time o r  economy relations, and such imitation 
arguments usually neglect the fact that one machine imitating another is greatly slowed 
up by the mechanics of describing the one machine in terms of the second. Even more 
important, however, is the fact that, under any known techniques one machine can 
imitate another or carry out its operations only if one can describe exactly, in precise 
detail, the first machine or  the desired operation to be performed. Of course, at I 
least for the present, this cannot be done for the human brain and many of its functions, 
[ref. 1, p. 3083 e * The general question remains open as to whether there are opera- ' 
tions (performable by humans or otherwise) which cannot be adequately handled by 
digital computers. In fact, it appears that there a r e  several distinct questions which 
a re  involved in establishing the capabilities of digital computers organized and opera- 
ting in accordance with today's technology. There is, on the one hand, the question 
of ultimate capabilities: Are there theoretical limitations which disallow performance 
of certain operations, regardless of the size of accessible memory space, with present 
day digital computers? Then, there is the question of-s: Are  
there practical limitations of economy, efficiency, or utility which restrict  the ange 
of operations performable with present-day digital computers ? Related to thest: 
questions is one concerning whether new machine structures would be useful for ex- 
panding the capabilities of machine performance, particularly for such human-like 
functions as pattern recognition, language translation, theorem-proving, and natural- 
language communication. This memorandum is concerned with these questions. 
The author's investigation of non-conventional machine structures was  begun 
with the vague thought that machines built around logical, natural-to-human primitive 
structures, combined in natural (and, thereby, non-conventional) organizations, might 
simplify a number of man-computer interaction problems, including the problems of 
translating from natural language to programming language, and compiling from pro- 
* Dreyfus [ref. 21 argues that it never can be done because of certain inherent 
ambiguity tolerances in human actions, etc. H i s  views are still in the heat of 
controversy with Minsky, Papert, and others. 
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gramming language to machine languages. To indicate the expected changes in  the 
logic of machine structure, the term %on-Boolean machines'' was adopted, and will 
be used in  the following discussion.* 
The Question of Non-Boolean Machhies 
The introductory comments suggest that the basic question to be considered in 
this document is whether conventional digital computers are adequate for satisfactory 
performance of certain natural "human" operations, o r  whether %on-Boolean" machine 
structures would be necessary or  more adequate. No attempt will be made t o  prove 
the necessity or  value of non-Boolean machines. Rather, several types of arguments 
favoring their application and development will simply be considered. Such arguments 
will hopefully demonstrate the need for careful consideration of the problems one might 
get into by coniining study to present-day digital computer organizations, and the poten- 
tial advantages of new, user-oriented designs. 
There a r e  various forms of arguments which may be presented justifying the 
investigation of non-Boolean machines. Preliminary consideration of arguments based 
on the following will be made: 
1. The opinions of certain experts (section 11) 
2. Ultimate capabilities of machines (section III) 
3. Structures of biological counterparts in brains, nervous systems, and the 
like (section IV) 
4. The value of natural-language programming (section V) 
5. Relative computational economies or efficiencies (section VI) 
6 .  The potential for successful development of new types of computer structures 
(section VII). 
The arguments of experts in  computation and related fields will be considered first. 
* 
*However, it should be noted that the term "non-Boolean machines" does not define or  
delineate any clear class of machines. The term is only suggestive of the non-con- 
ventional logic or  structure of machines; that is, machines with some degree of 
significant deviation from standard digital or analog computers. The reader is 
cautioned against reading too much into the term. Essentially, it may be replaced by 
the longer and less suggestive term %on-conventional machines" in all cases. 
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II. THE ARGUMENT FROM OPINIONS OF EXPERTS 
Many experts (including Shannon, McCulloch, Turing, Minsky, MacKay, Dreyfus, 
Taube, Davis, Kleene, McNaughton, Wang, et al. ) have discussed the universality of 
digital computers and have debated whether the digital computer can solve any problem 
which can be precisely stated. Also, Shannon and Pierce (ref. 1) have pointed out 
that just because a computer - can do something does not mean that it should do it. 
The desires of the users  and the needs for  optimal use of the computer human 
capabilities ought to be considered in determining what tasks to automate. As  Pierce 
says: 
"The fact that a general-purpose computer can do almost anything does 
not mean that computers do all things equally well. Some things they 
do much better than human beings; some things they do worse. Machines 
a re  not people. While it is highly desirable to strengthen their weakness, 
the greatest immediate gains, and some long-range ones as well, will 
come from exploiting their strengths. 
"Partly, the strengths of computers are associated with certain types of 
problems necessarily involving a great deal of straightforward computing 
on a great deal of input data, as opposed to game playing o r  recognition 
problems pef .  1, p. 295] ."  
He also noted that the strengths of computers are associated with their organization 
and programming. 
Agreeing with these arguments, Shannon expanded on them to note that such argu- 
ments (as well as those to be discussed in sections 111 through VII) suggest that 
'I. . . efficient machines for such problems as pattern recognition, language 
translation, and so on, may require a different type of computer than we have 
today. It is my feeling that this computer will be so organized that single 
components do not ca r ry  out simple, easily described functions. One cannot 
say that this transistor is used for this purpose, but rather that this group of 
components together performs such and such a function. . . .In a machine of the 
type I am suggesting, it would be impractial to describe the purpose o r  action 
of any single component. I know of very few devices in existence which exhibit 
this property of diffusion of function over many components [ref. 1, pp. 309-3101 . I 1  
(As will  be shown in section IV, there are certain brain functions which appear to 
be achieved in this gross, associative-structure wav. 1 
Shannon acknowledges that ''such a computer may lead us  in something 
very difficult for  humans to invent and something that requires very penetrating insights 
[ref. 1,  p. 3101, I '  But, he continues [ref. 1,  p. 3101, "If this sor t  of theoretical problem 
could be solved within the next few years, it appears likely that we shall have the hard- 
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t 
ware to implem-ent it. 'I Considering the advances in computer and device technology, 
he concludes that it is reasonable to ask: 
flCan we design with these a computer whose natural operation is in terms 
of patterns, concepts, and vague similarities rather than sequential opera- 
tions on ten-digit numbers? Can our next generation of computer experts 
give us a real mutation for  the next generation of computers [ref. 1, p. 3101 
In other words, can we build computers whose natural operations, o r  primitives, 
are readily expressible as patterns, concepts, similarities, o r  logical propositions 
which are natural for the human to use in natural-language communications? 
Vannevar Bush echoed Shannon's remarks [ref. 1, p. 3111 , observing: 
"To me some of the most interesting machines built by man are neither digital 
nor analog. I think that this field is somewhat neglected today; yet in it lies 
much of the promise for the future. I '  
Continuing this train of thought concerning the capabilities of machines of various 
structures, W a l t e r  Rosenblith [ref. 13 stated: 
W e  are hopeful that we shall gain added insight into both brains and computers 
by analyzing their structural principles in relation to their programmability. 
Some of Claude Shannon's remarks on serial  versus parallel operation, on 
diffused-function operation which hark back to a theme of von Neumann's, make 
this hope more explicit. Present-day neuroanatomy andneurophysiology do not 
furnish us  with recipes of what mix of hierarchical organization, specificity, 
randomness, and redundancy, will  yield a particular performance in the sensory 
domain, for  instance. These sciences are likewise incapable of telling u s  
today how evolution came to make such extended use of analog-to-digital (and 
vice versa) recoding and interaction schemes. Perhaps those who preside 
over the evolution of computers will contribute to the study of brain function by 
developing a series of calculi of relationsthat will in some sense transcend the 
digital versus  analog dichotomy. It 
These comments raise the issues as to the potential of digital versus analog, 
and parallel versus serial, machine structures, and the possibilities of other machine 
structures not fitting into these opposing categories. The digital-versus-analog and 
serial-versus-parallel dimensions of machine distinction are only two of many dimensions 
which might be possible in distinguishing machine structures. Shannon [ref. 1, pp. 
319-3201 has noted this, in saying that: 
"Computing machines as we have them today, the analog and the digital, are 
only two of a vast population which we have not yet explored. What I am saying 
in my challenge is that we should look to other possible machines in the same general 
area of information processing. I t  
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I 
Thus reiterating his position and clarifying the fact that he was not specifically 
suggesting that parallel machines would be better than the present serial forms, 
"but only that they would be different and might lead to the possiblity of doing more 
easily some of the things which seem difficult in serial machines [ref. 1, p.' 3191 , Iv 
Shannon suggested we ask, "Are there other types of computing machines that will 
do certain things better than the types we now have?" He closed with this comment: 
"I am suggesting that there well may be such machines. 
i 
I 
With regard to the potential for different types of machine structure, Minsky 
has noted [ref. 1, p. 3221 that: 
"Every designer of programming languages now-a-day is thinking about more 
complex associative memories for serial computers. Parallelism is in the air. 
The next generation of machines, o r  the one after the next generation, will 
certai nly have large parallel aspects. I' 
I 
I 
However, he noted that, despite the comments of Shannon and Pierce, "we are 
not sure that it [a conventional computer, like the IBM 70901 cannot solve many of 
the difficult intellectual problems that face us. I' Thus, in deference to some of the 
arguments given herein favoring new machine structures, Minsky shows more faith 
in the capabilities and utilities of present conventional machine structures. 
One controversial figure who takes issue with Minsky and other researchers 
involved with "artificial intelligence" is H. L. Dreyfus [ref. 2 1  . Although Dreyfus 
could hardly be termed a computer expert, he has raised a number of general questions 
about the ability of present computers to exhibit "artificial intelligence"; i. e. , to do 
things which would be considered to be "intelligentT1 if humans had done them. In 
a paper which has caused a stir of frustration at M. I. T., and in the general academic 
community concerned with artificial intelligence, Dreyfus suggested [ref. 2,  p. 2223 
that "there are four distinct types of intelligent activity, only two of which do not pre- 
suppose . . . [certain] human forms of information processing and can therefore be 
programmed. He concluded that: 
"Significant developments in artificial intelligence in the remaining two areas 
must await computers of an entirely different sort, of which the only existing 
prototype is the little-understood human brain. 
Dreyfus has raised some interesting points, which certainly favor consideration of 
non-conventional machine structures. 
It appears that regardless of what viewpoint is taken about the possibility of intel- 
ligent activity by machines, there is general agreement about the possibility of future 
machines taking on distinctively different structural forms, particularly if they are to 
perform such human-like tasks as theorem-proving, pattern recognition, and the like. 
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This is illustrated by contrasting Drefus' reasons for non-conventional machines 
with those of pro-artificial-intelligence researcher Paul Armer [ref. 3, p. 393) : ! 
I do not hold that the intelligent machines of the 1970's will necessarily resemble 
today's machines, either functionally or  physically. In particular, in my desire to 
see machines pushed further out in the continuum of intelligence, my interests in 
the dimension of speed are very minor; the organizational aspects (sophistication 
of the information processes) are obviously muchmdre important. Likewise, I 
hold no brief for the strictly digital approach; a combination of analog and digital 
equipment may prove to be better. I do not mean to disown the digital computer 
for  it will be a most important tool in the endeavor to advance in our continuum. 
All these opinions of experts in computation and related fields might be summar- 
ized by suggesting that non-Boolean machines may be significantly more useful than 
conventional digital machines, particularly for such problems as language translation, 
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III. THE ARGUMENT FROM ULTIMATE CAPABILITIES 
The question of ultimate capabilities as raised in the introductory comments 
concerns whether or  not there are theoretical limitations which disallow performance 
of certain operations, regardless of computation time and the size of accessible 
memory space, with present-day computers. This theoretical question leads one to 
consider the predictions of Turing machine theory, o r  general automata theory, con- 
cerning capabilities of various machines. This is particularly true in the light of how 
a general-purpose computer with unbounded memory is known to be equivalent to a 
universal Turing machine pefs. 4, 5,  61 . The assertion of their equivalence dictates 
that there are no problems which are solvable by any Turing machine that cannot be 
solved by such open-ended digital computers, and vice versa. Hence, considering 
the capabilities of Turing machines would indicate the maximum problem-solving 
potential for  present computers (maximum conditions occuring when a potentially 
infinite tape or  other storage and input-output system is available). 
The equivalence of universal Turing machines and computers demonstrates that 
if one is to justify a new machine type on the basis of its having more ultimate capa- 
bility than present computers, he needs to show that his new machine handles problems 
which a universal Turing machine cannot handle. This, in turn, raises the obvious 
question of whether there are any problems which a Turing machine cannot solve. 
Goedel's theorem [ref. 7 3,  Turing's results [ref. 61, and other more recent results 
by Davis [ref. 63, Chomsky [ref. 81, and others [ref. 91, demonstrate that there 
are some such problems. Perhaps, then, non-Boolean machines might be built 
which solve such problems, and hence would have more ultimate capabilities than 
conventional computers. This is a natural and tempting supposition. * 
However, one must be somewhat cautious about misunderstanding the results 
obtained in the "pure science" of general automata theory (with its associated predic- 
tions about ultimate capabilities of mathematical machines) and their implications on 
the "applied scienceTr of computation theory (with its associated questions about what 
practical computers can effectively do). This is particularly well brought out by 
Davis' comments in discussing the practical implications of the abstract theory of 
computability: 
"The existence of universal Turing machines, another result of the theory, 
confirms the belief of those working with digital computers that it is possible 
to construct a single "all-purpose" digital computer on which can be programmed 
(subject of course to limitations of time and memory capacity) any problem that 
could be programmed for any conceivable deterministic digital computer. 
This assertion is sometimes heard in the strengthened form: anything that 
can be made completely precise can be programmed for an all-purpose digital 
* However, its acceptance would imply the denial of Church's thesis [ref. 103 and 
the generally accepted universality of Turing machines. 
commonly accepted viewpoint that Turing machines can compute anything which is 
"effectively" (i. e. , "mechanically") calculable. 
It would contradict the 
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computer. However, in  this form, the assertion is false. In fact, one of the 
basic results of the theory of computability (namely, the existence of nonrecursive, 
recursively enumerable sets) may be interpreted as asserting the possibility of 
programming a given computer in such a way that it is impossible to program 
a computer (either a copy of the given computer or  another machine) so as to 
determine whether or  not a given item will be part of the output of the given 
computer [ref. 4, p. vii] . I '  
The error.involved in suggesting (e. g., 
stated completely precise can be programmed on a general-purpose digital computer" 
illustrates the e r ro r s  one can get into by careless restatement of the formal results 
of mathematical machine theory. Davis [ref. 61, Goedel [ref. 71, Turingcref. 61, 
and others [ref. 5) give numerous other examples of precisely specifiable, but 
unsolvable problems. In addition, a number of practical, significant problems 
unsolvable by universal Turing machines have been found in mathematical linguistics 
and other fields (e. g., ref. 8 and other references therein). 
ref. 1, p. 308) that "anything that can be 
Thus, there exists a set  of problems (not all of which are merely pedagogical) 
which, though amenable to precise statement, are unsolvable by universal Turing 
machines, and thus unsolvable by general-purpose computers, regardless of time 
and memory capacities. 
It is tempting to infer from this that computers are inadequate for handling certain 
human-like activities or  problems and, thereby, that computers cannot be artificially 
intelligent. This might encourage one to look for new (i. e., "non-Boolean") machine 
types which would succeed where the present computers are expected to fail. This, 
for  example, appears to be part of the motivation behind Dreyfus' conclusion Eef. 2, 
p. iii) about the ultimate ineptitude of present computers and the need for "computers 
of an entirely different sort. ' I  (See also section Tv of this paper. ) Certainly, a 
confusion concerning the practical significance of Goedel's theorem and associated 
limitations of abstract machines is involved in the conclusion drawn by Nagel and Newrn 
kef. 11, p. 16951 and reiterated by Taube kef. 12, p. 41 that: 
n 
"Goedel's conclusions also have a bearing on the question whether calculating 
machines can be constructed which would be substitutes for  a living mathemati- 
cal intelligence. Such machines, as currently constructed and planned, operate 
in obedience to a fixed set of directives built in, and they involve mechanisms 
which proceed in  a step-by-step manner. But in the light of Goedel's incomplete- 
ness theorem, there is an endless set of problems in elementary number theory 
for which such machines a r e  inherently incapable of supplying answers, however 
complex their built-in mechanisms may be and however rapid their operations. 
It may very well be the case that the human brain is itself a "machine" with 
built-in limitations of its own, and that there a r e  mathematical problems which 
it is incapable of solving. Even so the human brain appears to embody a struc- 
ture of rules of operation which is far more powerful than the structure of currently 
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conceived artificial machines. 
the human mind by robots. 
Regardless of how much one m 
I 
There is no immediate prospect of replacing 
1 
y agree with Nagel and Newman's conclusion on- 
cerning the relative powers of human minds and ''calculating machines, IT one should 
be able to see the e r ror  in their application of Goedel's results. Goedel's incomplete- 
ness theorems (and several other subsequent results in mathematical logic, recursive 
function theory, and the theory of computability) demonstrate the existence of problems 
unsolvable by Turing machines and, hence, by digital computers. But, no one has 
ever demonstrated (and it is unlikely that they ever could demonstrate) that any of 
these unsolvable problems a r e  solvable by humans or any particular new types of 
machines. That is ,  no machines have been found that exhibit more power than univer- 
sal Turing machines. Moreover, i t  has been argued rather convincingly by Putnam 
(ref. 13) and Scriven (ref. 14, and also ref. 15, pp. 139-140) that Goedel's 
theorem is no more an obstacle to a computer than to humans. One may then conclude 
with Arbib [ref. 15, p. 1407 that "Goedel's theorem is not to be taken as a proof 
that no machine can be intelligent, IT and, more generally, that Goedel's theorem and 
other associated results are not to be taken as proof of inadequacies exhibited solely 
by present digital computers. 
The argument up to this point might be summarized by saying that, since general- 
purpose digital computer s, when endowed with potentially infinite memory, are be- 
haviorally equivalent to universal Turing machines, ultimate-capability arguments 
favoring non-Boolean machines will depend on exhibiting problems solvable by some 
new machine type but unsolvable by a universal Turing machine. On the assumption 
that such exhibited problems could be considered to involve only "effectively calcula- 
ble" functions, such results would refute Turing's hypothesis Eef. and Church's 
thesis kef. lo]. Frankly, the results to date, and the viewpoints taken by most 
researchers interested in this problem, would suggest that the search for such prob- 
lems would be fruitless. Nevertheless, it is an open question as to whether such 
problems and associated non-Boolean machines do exist. The burden of proof, 
however, rests on him who would assert that such problems a re  to be found. 
The discussion of ultimate capabilities as has been considered here does not 
involve the amount of time required for computations. Such time considerations might 
be considered to be most closely related to  the questions of efficiency and economy 
to be discussed in section VI. Yet, there is a sense in which it is reasonable to 
consider computation times in relation to ultimate machine capabilities. Since many 
of the human-like operations which one may wish to automate (e. g., visual pattern 
recognition, speech recognition and synthesis, game playing, and the like), and which 
are not being handled completely adequately by present digital computers, are most 
properly handled as real-time problems of man-computer interaction, it is appropriate 
to consider ultimate capabilities in comparison to what have been called "real-time 
automata" kef. 5, pp. 402-411, and refs. 16, 171 . Thus, it may be most appro- 
priate in  the long run to compare the ultimate capabilities of conventional and various 
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non-Boolean machines in terms of operations they can perform within certain time 
liiiiits foliowiiig iiiput iiilles, i-iztlier i h i 1  in iei.ms of unlimited-tiiiie Tuisiiig machine 
ope rations . 
In considering the significance of real-time operations, it is important to note 
several ways in which real-time operation may affect ultimate capabilities. 
McNaughton noted in 1961 [ref. 5, pp. 403-g that Yamada's work kefs. 17,  181 
suggests that there are computable transformations (i, e. , operations performable 
by a universal Turing machine) which cannot be performed in real-time (at least 
by any known real-time device, and, probably, by no real-time operating device). 
Thus, the set of real-time computable functions is apparently a proper subset of the 
set of all computable functions. 
On the basis of this prediction one might expect that two general-purpose machines 
which differ in structure may (although each is equivalent to a universal Turing machine 
in the ultimate, time-independent sense) differ in the set of real-time operations they 
may perform. This is well brought out by several open questions which McNaughton 
noted [ref. 5, pp. 403-61: 
"For example, for real-time operations a Turing machine with one tape is 
(possibly) not the most general type of growing automaton. It is an open ques- 
tion whether Turing machines with several tapes can do real-time operations 
that Turing machines with a single tape cannot do. Insight gained from Yamada 
[ref. 181 (the first work to my knowledge t o  discuss real-time operations in 
the theory of automata) seems to favor an  affirmative conjecture on this ques- 
tion.. . 
'I. e .  there may be real-time operations performable by [Holland's] iterative 
circuit computers but not performable by multitape Turing machines. As  far 
as I know, this is an open question.. . 
"An open problem is whether the multiplication of arbitrarily large numbers is 
a real-time operation. 
'I. . . The problem of characterizing (by some mathematically interesting nec- 
essary  and sufficient condition) [symbol] sequences that result from real-time 
operations is an unsolved one. If  
These questions have been the subject of much subsequent research [refs. 16, 17 ,  193 . 
There is thus a significant difference between the ultimate capabilities (i. e. , 
with potentially infinite memory) of a machine operating in real-time and one opera- 
ting in general Turing machine fashion without time restrictions. It may well be 
that real-time capabilities a r e  of most interest to the question of whether non- 
Boolean machines are required. Yamada's results and the possibility of real-time 
operations performable by non-conventional machine types (such as Holland's itera- 
tive circuit computers), but not performable by present sequential processors, 
apparently favor the consideration of non-Boolean machine structures. 
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IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM BIOLOGICAL COUNTERPARTS 
Interesting aspects of the above question of ultimate capabilities are concerned 
with the functional or  ITbehavioral" study of machines, and (with the exception of the 
effects of real-time constraints) have little or  no association with the duplication of 
machine structure or  techniques for solution. In contrast, the argument from bio- 
logical counterparts as it will be presented in this section is very much concerned 
with specific structures and techniques for problem solution. 
The point of the argument from biological counterparts is just this: the synthesis 
of machines to perform certain cognitive processes may be advanced and simplified 
by studying and duplicating the techniques and structures used in the biological 
systems which successfully perform those functions. Thus, if one wishes to have 
adequate pattern recognizers, theorem provers, language translators, and so forth, 
following the biological counterparts as working, structured models may ease the 
design process. This is essentially the viewpoint of the field of bionics, which, as 
McCulloch has said [ref. 20, p. 3931 "is concerned. , . primarily with a n  attempt to 
understand sufficiently well the tricks that nature actually uses  to solve her problems, 
thus enabling us  to turn them into hardware." 
It is true that duplication of human brain structure is nomore needed to achieve 
corresponding behavior than one needs to build airplanes like birds or ships like 
ducks or fish.  But, just as in those cases, there may be some laws and principles 
of operation which are common to the natural and artificial systems, and which it 
may prove profitable to discover. Thus the implication that duplication of structure 
is necessary to the duplication of behavior is not being made. On the contrary, it 
should be clear that duplication of terminal behavior will =necessarily require 
duplication of techniques of solution or of "machine" structure. It is helpful to keep 
this distinction in mind when considering the implications of biological counterparts 
of machine structures. For further discussion of this distinction, see MacKay's 
excellent studies [refs. 21-23] . However, turning this argument around may make 
it equally clear that the distinction between duplication of behavior and duplication of 
structure does not negate the value of using the structural features of available bio- 
logical systems to aid in the structural design of machines which duplicate behavior 
of those biological systems. It still is true that following the biological counterpart 
as a working, structured example may ease the machine synthesis process. (An example 
of the design of mechanisms by use of biological prototypes is given in reference 24, 
especially page 292. ) This apparently was the viewpoint of vonNeumann, who is 
said to have believed that more is to be learned about machines from the study of 
neurology [and other biological science4 than is to be learned about biological sys- 
tems from the study of machines kef. 12, p. 1271 . 
The potential for simulating cognitive behavior of biological systems has been 
the subject of great debate since the advent of the digital computer. 
tive examples of resulting "artificial intelligence" studies, see reference 25). One 
(For representa- 
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recent critic of certain attempts to simulate cognitive processes has been Dreyfus 
cannot be simulated: 
kef. 21, who, as noted in section 11, has concluded that certain cognitive behavior 
"An examination of.. . [difficulties encountered in attempting to simulate cogni- 
tive processes on digital computer4 reveals that the attempt to analyze intelli- 
gent behavior in digital computer language systematically excludes three funda- 
mental human forms of information processing (fringe consciousness, essence/ 
accident discrimination, and ambiguity tolerence). Moreover, there are four 
distinct types of intelligent activity, only two of which do not presuppose these 
human forms of information processing and can therefore be programmed. 
must await computers of an entirely different sort, of which the only existing proto- 
type is the little-understood human brain '[ref. 2, p. iiq . ' I  
Dreyfus attempts to formulate and criticize the common assumption, shared by 
Significant developments in artificial intelligence in the remaining two areas 
many workers in artificial intelligence, that humans face the same difficulties in 
cognitive processing as machines do, and that, therefore, the difficulties encountered 
by machines in simulating cognitive behavior obviously can be overcome, since humans 
overcome them. It is beyond the interest and scope of this paper to discuss or  cri- 
ticize Dreyfus' arguments. It may be noted in passing that, in one sense, they seem 
to constitute another in the ser ies  of arguments to the effect that "you'll never 
get digital computers to do such-and-such". Such arguments are believed by MacKay 
and others [refs. 22, 23, 261 to be "foredoomed as soon as the speaker has been 
induced to  say precisely what behavior he would regard as satisfactory kef. 221 , 
but Dreyfus' objection to  this would seem to be that these very processes cannot 
be precisely described in determinate step-by-step fashion (ref. 2, especially p. 49). 
It is their intractability to such standard algorithmic solution, their inherent vague- 
ness o r  "global" character, that led Dreyfus to  look toward "computers of an entirely 
different sort  [ref. 2, p. iii] IT to handle these cognitive processes. 
In general, if any such behavioral inadequacies for cognitive processing by digital com- 
mters  could be demonstrated, they would certainly favor the development of non-Boolean 
nachines. This is directly analogous to the observation in the previous section that problems 
tltimately unsolvable by universal digital machines might favor development of new machine types. 
From these remarks one can see that any inability of present digital computers 
io duplicate certain human cognitive behavior would favor the development of non- 
Boolean machines. But, in addition, even if present computers could be shown to 
duplicate all such behavior successfully, it is not clear that that alone would be 
considered satisfactory. A s  Shannon and McCarthy [ref. 27, p. vi] have pointed 
out, 
'I. . . it is possible, in principle, to  design a machine with a complete set of 
arbitrari ly chosen responses to all possible input stimuli.. . . Such a machine, 
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in a sense, merely looks up in a "dictionary" the appropriate response.. . 
Such a machine. . . does not reflect our usual intuitive concept of thinking. This 
suggests that a more fundamental definition [of 'thinking' and of 'artificial cogni- 
tive processors7 must involve something relating to the manner in which the 
machine arrives at its responses.. . something which corresponds to differentia- 
ting between a person who solves a problem by thinking it out and one who has 
previously memorized the answer. [Emphasis added1 
Similar reasoning has led Kochen, MacKay, and their colleagues [ref. 26, p. 21 to 
conclude that: 
I!. . . although output behavior is crucial, it is entirely legitimate to examine 
the way in which it is produced, including the structure and its information 
flow-map, as a way of checking that it is "genuine" and not "rigged" o r  "acci- 
dental. 
MacKay has thus been led to  consider a more challenging problem than merely dupli- 
cating input-output behavior, namely, 'lHow far is it possible to envisage an artificial 
mechanism that would not only imitate human behavior, but work internally on the 
same principles as the brain [ref. 22, p. 2631 ?l l  
When one considers this more demanding question, one quickly notes marked 
differences between the manner in which the brain functions and is structured and 
the manner in which conventional digital computers operate. These differences 
of technique and structure may be important to the justification and synthesis of 
non-Boolean machines, as was pointed out by the comments of Shannon, Pierce, 
Rosenblith, and others quoted in section 11. Consider again, for example, the 
comments of Shannon [ref. 1, p. 3091 : 
"If there are these important differences at the psychological level between 
computers as we have them today and brains, one may raise the question as to 
whether this is a reflection of a different internal organization, and if so, what 
a re  the chief differences? I believe that, in fact, there is very little similarity 
between the methods of operation of the computers and the brain. Some of the 
apparent differences are the following. In the first place, the wiring and circuitry 
of the computers a r e  extremely precise and methodical. A single incorrect 
connection will generally cause e r r o r s  and malfunctioning. The connections in 
the brain appear, at least locally, to be rather random, and even large num- 
bers of malfunctioning parts do not cause complete breakdown of the system. 
In the second place, computers work on a generally serial basis, doing one 
small operation at a time. The nervous system, on the other hand, appears to 
be more of a parallel-type computer with a large fraction of the neurons active 
at any given time. In the third place, it may be pointed out that most computers 
a re  either digital or analog. The nervous system seems to have a complex 
mixture of both representations of data. 
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It was these distinctions (and other arguments to be considered in this  memoran- 
dum) that led Shannon to conclude that "efficient machines for such problems as pattern 
recognition, language translation, and so on, may require a different type of computer 
than any we have today [ref. 1,  p. 3091 . I 1  
One of the most frequently noted distinctions between computers and their  biological 
counterparts is the use of analog, as well as digital, processing in brains (for example, 
ref. 28, Ch. 1;  ref 29, p. 27; ref 27, p. 5;  ref. 30, p. 91; ref. 1, pp. 309, 311, 314 
319 ; ref. 31, p. 68) .  Although crude approximations to the action of individual 
neurons in brains and nervous systems permit somewhat of a digital flon-offl' charac- 
terization of nerve pulses, there are distinctively analog processes involved in 
individual neurons, in the operation of nervous "subsystems", and in  general opera- 
tion of nervous systems. Von Neumann noted this in his excellent introduction to 
the similarities and differences between computers and brains [ref. 311. For example, 
he noted that: 
I 
I t .  . .processes which go through the nervous system may.. . change their character 
from digital to analog, and back to digital, etc., repeatedly. Nerve pulses, 
i. e., the digital part  of the mechanism, may control a particular stage of such a 
process, e.g., the contraction of a specific muscle or  the secretion of a specific 
chemical. This phenomenon is one belonging to the analog class.. . the nerve- 
pulse part  of the system, which is digital, and the one involving chemical changes 
or  mechanical dislocations due to muscular contractions, which is of the analog 
type, may, by alternating with each other, give any particular process a mixed 
character [ref. 31, pp. 68-91 . I '  
Add to these factors the mixed nature of the summation and threshold operation of 
a neuron (e.g., ref. 27, p. 5; refs, 32, 33; -ef. 31, pp. 52-60), the frequency en- 
coding of stimulus intensities (e. g., ref. 34, p. 123; ref. 31, p. 79), and the presence 
of some analog properties in  the neuron pulse [ref. 35, p. 231 , and one can readily 
see sharp distinctions from present computers of either strictly digital or strictly 
analog form. 
These mixed aspects of the nervous system a re  not trivial features insignificant 
to the mode of operation and general terminal behavior of these biological systems. 
The logic of threshold operation and the adjustment of peripheral threshold levels 
by the reticular formation (to effect changes in logical function performed by the 
neural network), for example, are directly involved in  what Warren McCulloch calls 
"the great problem of the nervous system", the reticular formation, or  core of the 
brain structure [ref. 331. The reticular formation controls what signals the brain 
will receive from peripheral nerves, and decides to what basic mode of behavior the 
whole organism will be committed. It does so by analog feedback controlling the 
thresholds of peripheral neurons, and by a triadic and intentional decision logic which 
defies representation by conventional logic systems [ref. 331 . 
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A basic characteristic of the reticular formation is its "redundancy of potential 
command" resulting from broad parallel and associative processing in its iterative 
networks[ref. 331 . This is an example of thegeneral use of parallel processing in 
biological systems. Numerous other examples could be given. In general, von Neumann 
has summarized this important distinction between biological mechanisms and con- 
ventional artificial ones by remarking that [ref. 31, pp. 51-21 : 
I!.. . an efficiently organized large natural automaton (like the human nervous system) 
will tend to pick up as many logical (or informational) items as possible simultan- 
eously, and process them simultaneously, while an efficiently organized artificial 
automaton (like a largemoderncomputing machine) will be more likely to do things 
successively. . . That is ,  large and efficient natural automata are likely to be highly 
parallel, while large and efficient artificial automata will  tend to be less so, and 
rather to be serial. 
?I. .  . it should be noted, however, that parallel and serial operation are not unre- 
strictedly substitutable for each other. IT.  . [Translation from a serial scheme 
to a parallel one may be impossible o r  difficult, requiring a change in logic and 
procedural organization, and, conversely] "the desire to serialize a parallel 
procedure may impose new requirements on the automaton.. . Hence the logical 
approach and structure in natural automata may be expected to differ widely from 
those in  [conventional] 'artificial automata. 
Von Neumann [ref. 301 and others [refs. 35, 361 have also developed models for how 
biological systems achieve reliable computation with unreliable components, by 
the use of parallel processing or "multiplexing" Lref. 30, p. 63ff ] , logical vTcoding" 
[ref. 34, pp. 1231, and other mechnisms not prevalent in conventional computers. 
The several advantages of parallel processing have led to the development of new 
machine structures such as "multiprocessors" and "iterative circuit computers. 
Yet, it seems that, in spite of its definite importance to the justification of non-con- 
ventional machine structures, strict parallelism alone is not enough. It appears that 
many brain functions (such as certain peripheral data processing operations in a 
nervous system ref. 36, p. 1231, some inter-neural interactions in visual sensor 
systems [ref. 37 \ , and aspects of the reticular formation operations [refs. 38, 39 f 
are best represented not by many distinct, simultaneous parallel computations, but 
rather by some involved, "integrativeft, '!associative" processes in which many com- 
ponents a r e  involved in a single computation and single components do not carry out 
simple, easily separated functions. * The apparent presence and importance of such 
* This form of associative or  integrative processing is, in particular, achieved by 
what McCulloch calls anastomotic networks [ref. 361 in which many simple com- 
ponents or neurons are replaced by a rank of complex components each member of 
which is computing, in general, a different function of its inputs. 
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associative o r  "diffused-function" processing in human information-handling systems 
seems to be a particularly strong point favoring the development of non-Boolean 
machines. 
It is this form of diffused-function computer which Shannon looked to for handling 
such problems as pattern recognition, language translation, and the like. The value 
of diffused-function operation, particularly in the light of its apparent use in biological 
systems, encourages one to look toward the development of non-Boolean machines 
with this form of modus operandi. 
Such associative or "diffused-functionf' operation violates the standard principle 
of "one organ for each basic operation [ref. 31, p. 131 . I f  Although this principle has  been 
helpful in the design of system structures and programming techniques which permit 
easy understanding of the functions of all components and subsystems at all times, 
it is by no means necessary to the successful performance-of any given terminal 
behavior. Its extensive use in digital machine design may in the long run turn out to 
be an unfortunate result of historical accident (or poor design choice) rather than an 
intrinsic requirement of machine operation. The fact that analog computers are not 
built with only one organ for each basic operation illustrates the potential dispensa- 
bility of the principle [ref. 31, pp. 13-14]. 
The principle of "one organ for each basic operationf' has resulted in another 
major discrepancy between digital machine organization and apparent structures of 
biological counterparts; that is in terms of the embodiment of memory in the two 
systems. Von Neumann has observed, "The 'only one organ for each basic operation' 
principle necessitates.. .the providing for a larger number of organs that can be used 
to store numbers. . . The totality of these organs is called a 'memory'. . . [ref. 31, 
p. 141. I' The result of the single-function principle is thus the separation of memory 
from other operations, yielding the familiar "memory unit" of digital computers. 
There is no indication that memory exists as such a separate organ in  biological systems. 
In fact, there are strong reasons to suspect that it may be distributed throughout the 
nervous system. Witness, for example, this observation by neurophysiologist 
0. H. Schmitt: 
"In all probability the central nervous system, including its memory and com- 
puting functions, is a widely distributive statistical time-place-state system where 
memory of a particular event is smeared out over some millions of cells and 
these same cells simultaneously hold many millions of other memory traces 
[ref. 40, p. 2511 
This distribution of memory throughout the system is more like that of Holland 
and SOLOMON machines than conventional computers [refs. 41, 421 . Von Neumann 
and others [ref. 31, pp. 60-68; refs. 43, 44, 451 have discussed some possible ways 
in which memory may be physically embodied in the nervous system. 
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In general, these studies of the nervous system suggest that the "functional blocks" 
(e. g. , memory unit, arithmetic unit, control unit, and the like) of conventional com- 
puters are not in direct correspondence with any llblockstf in brains, and that there 
are thus general differences in structure of computers and biological information- 
processing systems. These differences do not necessarily imply differences in ulti- 
mate or practical capabilities, but they do favor development of non-Boolean machines 
if one accepts the premise that duplication of performance is faciliated by duplication 
of structure. 
The argument from biological counterparts, as presented in this section, may be 
summarized by noting the many ways in which techniques and structure of biological 
systems differ from conventional computers, Computation in nervous systems is not 
strictly digital; it involves analog processes of many types. Synaptic digital-to- 
analog and analog-to-digital transformations, input summation processes, threshold 
operation and corresponding threshold logic, frequency and spatial codings of stimulus 
intensities, and even the fact that the neural pulse is not strictly on-off in nature. 
illustrate the analog and mixed analog-digital features of the biological systems. 
Parallel processing and diffused-function operation prevail in anastomotic networks, 
with attendant redundancies of operation and improved system reliability with unre- 
liable components. No  separate "memory units, It  and the like, are apparent in 
these biological systems. 
Thus, despite frequently noted similarities between digital computers and biologi- 
cal systems, there are marked differences between them. These differences do suggesl 
definite value in developing non-Boolean machines, if one accepts the premise that 
the desired duplication of human cognitive behavior is facilitated by the duplication of 
structures of biological counterparts. However, this does not suggest that one must 
confine structures of new machines strictlyto the forms of human brains o r  other 
biological counterparts. Such a restriction might prove no less of an e r r o r  than 
confining structures to conventional digital computer forms. The objective is not 
necessarily to duplicate the brain, but rather to make use of its helpful working 
tthints't about how to structure machines for human-like tasks such as pattern recog- 
nition, theorem proving, speech recognition and synthesis, language translation, and 
the like. 
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V. THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURAL-LANGUAGE PROGRAMMING 
One basic way in which the operation of conventional computers differs from that 
of biological prototypes is in terms of the languages used. As  von Neumann observed, 
"the language of the brain" is not "the language of mathematics?' o r  the "machine 
language" of today [ref. 31, pp. 80-821. This distinction is also exhibited at a 
higher level, in the sense that the languages presently used in communication within 
and among machines, and between machines and man, are distinctively different 
from natural languages used in human communication. 
An argument favoring non-Boolean machines can be associated with this distinc- 
tion between machine and human languages. It is perhaps the most interesting, but 
at the same time perhaps the most vague and nebulous, argument favoring non- 
Boolean machines. It is concerned specifically with the development of natural, 
flexible means of communication between man and machine. Crudely said, this 
argument suggests that machines built around logical, natural-to-human primitive 
structures, combined in natural (and, thereby, probably nonconventional) organiza- 
tions , might simplify a number of man-computer interaction problems, including 
the problems of translating from natural language to programming language, and 
compiling from programming language to machine languages. 
Consider in detail the nature and importance of the distinction between human and 
machine languages, the relationships of such to machine structures, and the implica- 
tions on the effectiveness of man-machine communication. 
As a result of extensive training and practice, man speaks and understands a 
natural language. He thus has a language for communicating. Machines, on the 
other hand, are designed and structured in such a way as to have the i r  own languages 
for communicating. If there is a language barrier or difference between the man 
and the machine, one or  both may have to be adjusted in what language to use. Thus, 
either the machine must learn the man's language, or  the man must learn the machine's 
language, or  each must compromise and learn some intermediate language. 
Although there may not be universal agreement about which (man or  machine) 
should adjust the more to meet the language of the other communicant, many computer 
researchers  would suggest that man has done more than his share of accommodating 
to the machine. Witness the assertion of Green, Wolf, Chomsky, and Laughery 
[ref. 46, p. 207' that: 
"Men typically communicate with computers in a variety of artificial, stylized, 
unambiguous languages that are better adapted to the machine than to the man. ' I  
An extreme case of man's accommodating to the machine has occurred with 
binary o r  numerical machine codes used extensively since the advent of the digital 
computer. Such binary coding may be appropriate to the internal structure of the 
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present two-valued Boolean-logic machines, and may in the ultimate sense be capable 
of representing any given message one might wish to communicate. But it would 
not, in general, be the most economical and effective language of communication. 
Economy of expression, for example, as exemplified by lengths of statements or  symbol- 
sequences, may be improved by increasing the size of the "vocabulary" of possible 
symbols in the expressions. As  the vocabulary size (V)increases from two (binary) 
symbols to larger numbers, the length (k) of sequences needed to represent any set 
k D of distinguishable messages will decrease in accordance with the relation D = V , 
or,  equivalently, k = log D/log V. 
The progress of computer language design has demonstrated the awkwardness 
and severe constraints which are invoked upon the computer user when he attempts 
to communicate in a language of binary form. Although the digital computer is well 
adapted to rapid handling of binary signals, humans a r e  not. Real-time, man-machine 
communication in such a language is next to impossible. Added to such difficulties 
a re  the consequent needs for the user to understand the gory details of machine structures, 
instructions, and operational manipulation of programs. 
Because of the many inconveniences of such detailed machine coding, and 
basically as  a result of the shorthand used by computer designers and users ,  a variety 
of assembly languages evolved, so as to allow naming and reference to general pro- 
cedures involving several specific machine operations. Also, as the next step toward 
making languages for communication with machines appears more like the languages 
of mathematics and other usual notations used by humans, programming languages 
like FORTRAN were developed. The development of such high-level programming 
languages resulted in such advantages as drastically reduced costs of programming, 
easy, precise statement of problems without the need to specify all minute details 
of machine operation, and a wider spread use of computers by scientists and busi- 
nesses. The brevity of statement, flexibility, and increased naturalness of these more 
powerful languages has contributed much to the effectiveness of man-computer 
communication. They also make better use of the extensive training and experience 
humans already have with "natural" languages. 
The trend has thus been toward languages with larger vocabularies, more 
flexible structures, and in general, more natural form. The utility of user-oriented 
programming languages which were closer to natural languages than t o  
machine codes w a s  thus empirically demonstrated. It is easy to understand why 
such empirical results should obtain. The inefficiency and awkwardness of an extremely 
small (binary) vocabulary had to be avoided. On the other hand, at the other extreme 
ofvery  large vocabulary size, very short statements would result, but severe re -  
quirements on memory capacity would be required to distinguish the members of the 
very large vocabulary. 
This trade-off between length of expression and vocabulary size appears to have 
been involved in the evolution of natural languages. The large, but clearly restricted, 
vocabulary used by English speakers makes it possible to express complex thoughts 
in reasonably short statements. 
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In general, both the empirical demonstration of the utility of natural-like pro- 
gramming languages (as displayed by the cited history of computer language forms) 
and the above argument about the virtue of a compromise between vocabulary size 
and brevity of statement illustrate the value of programming languages which are 
close to natural languages in form. Further justifications for natural-language-like 
programming abound in the literature [refs. 47, 48, 261. For example, witness 
Green et a1 in their assertion that: 
"For convenience and speed, many future computer-centered systems will 
require men to  communicate with computers in natural language kef. 46, p. 2073. 
The importance of natural language programming has been recognized as a major 
objective of the extensive DEACON project [ref. 47, p. 11 : 
"The first objective is to allow natural English as a language for man-machine 
communication. . . . English, as a natural language, is an ideal language for man- 
machine communication. It is a language that society has evolved for communi- 
cation of an extremely wide range of data, relationships, and concepts, and it is 
the language most familiar to military and civilian managers, to intelligence 
analysts, and, in general, to any senior user who has achieved his position of 
responsibility at least partially through facility in the use of spoken or  written 
English. 
"In many circumstances it is important that responsible senior men be able to  
work directly with the computer system, rather than through an intervening 
screen of programmers. This will be practical only when a natural language 
such as English is the vehicle of communication. 
"A second and perhaps more important reason for using English is the great 
flexibility the language possesses. Expressions of infinite variety, subtlety, 
novelty, and complexity can be constructed from English words and phrases 
through the use of a relatively small number of rules of grammar. The 
language has evolved s o  that it is easy for new concepts and relationships to be 
described in a sentence that can be formulated and understood by any native 
speaker. 
In summary, there are ample reasons to consider having man-machine communi- 
cation be achievedwith languages similar or  identical to natural human languages. 
The inefficiencies and awkwardness of machine coding a r e  avoided, the flexibility 
and expressive power of natural languages a re  available, the enhanceability of natural 
languages permits novel expressions, the gory details of machine operation do not 
have to  be understood or programmed by the user, and the training and experience 
which humans have with natural languages a re  effectively utilized, thus avoiding 
costly and time-consuming retraining of computer users.  These a priori reasons 
are substantiated by empirical results and trends in the computer industry, as 
higher level and more natural programming languages evolve. 
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Thus, in a sense, the extensive accommodation of the man to the machine has 
been recognized and is steadily diminishing. 
accommodate more and more to the man's language in an attempt to  bridge the gap 
o r  language barrier between man and machine. This is being accomplished not by 
basic changes in the internal structure of the computer, but rather by the  use of 
translation equipment (compilers, and the like) intermediate between the computer 
and the user. 
The machine is being called upon to  
The present language barrier problem and solution techniques might by illustrated 
as in Figure 1. The computer user  has a problem expressed in a language natural 
to the problem (English, mathematical expressions, and so forth). He must some- 
how translate this problem statement into a form interpretable by the computer's 
central processing unit. With the present convcntional programming language com- 
promise, he does so by writing a corresponding program in the programming language, 
i. e. , he translates from natural to programming language. The machine's program- 
ming language processor (compiler, interpreter, o r  the like) translates this program 
into a corresponding sequence of basic assembly-language statements. These assem- 
bly language statements are in turn translated into basic machine-language operations. * 
The compilers and assemblers involved are costly and time-consuming to build. Thus, 
communication with the machine under the present compiling technique is a multiple 
step process, with associated inefficiencies and complications. 
Machine - Programming Assembly Natural 
Language Language Language Language - - 
Figure 1. - Multiple step translation between natural and machine languages 
This present technique for man-machine communication thus represents an 
(admittedly rather useful) compromise solution to the language barr ier  between man 
and machine. The man must translate his natural-language problems into a high- 
level programming language, and the machine is responsible for translating from the 
programming language to its internal machine language [ref. 1, p. 2991 . 
The trend toward more natural programming languages is easing man's 
translation process while complicating the machine's. More and more demands are 
being placed on the compilers and other language processors to achieve effective 
man-machine communication with natural-like languages. In this sense, the mach- 
ines are being asked to learn and act more intelligently in their communication with 
men. 
* In some cases, the operations of the compiler and assembler are combined, re- 
ducing the programming-to-machine-language translation to essentially one step. 
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The various forms  of programming languages developed within this conventional 
compilation method of translating between man and machine languages are to a con- 
siderable extent a function of machine structures. Davis has, for example, pointed 
out that: 
I'The emphasis on and use of procedure-oriented languages has probably been 
a direct result of the von Neumann concept of digital computers adopted univer- 
sally by the computer design industry. This concept i s ,  of course, characterized 
by the sequential procedure of producing a problem solution, incorporated bodily 
by designers of procedure-oriented languages [ref. 49, p. 1251. 
If .  . . procedure-oriented programming languages based upon the von Neumann 
sequential computer concept comprise almost the total set of existing programming 
languages [ref. 49, p. 128]." 
This dependence of present programming languages upon the standard von 
Neumann concepts of "one organ for  each basic operation" and sequential operation 
may prove a handicap to communication with machines. As  the argument in section 
N suggests, parallel and diffused-function operation may be most appropriate in the 
design of future machines, and for those new modes of operation new languages may 
be needed. 
Newell, Shaw, and Simon [ ref. 50, p. 411 have appropriately observed that 
"communication is limited by the intelligence of the least participant" and "the r ise  
of effective communication between man and computer will coincide with the rise in 
the intelligence of the computer. If  Then if, in fact, Dreyfus and others a re  correct 
in asserting (cf. section N) the need for  new types of machines to obtain more 
machine intelligence, better communication between man and machine will result 
f rom the development of such new (%on-Boolean") machines. The prerent compiling 
methods a re ,  in  a sense, an  attempt to  achieve the same results with no such basic 
changes in machine structure. 
An alternative solution to the standard multiple-step translation technique is to 
bridge the gap between natural and machine languages by eliminating (or drastically 
reducing) that gap. If one makes the machine language equivalent to, o r  at  least 
close to, human natural languages, the problem of translation is simplified. 
In other words, it appears that much of the need for compromise, retraining, 
and so forth, on the part  of the man or machine could be eliminated if the machines 
were so designed that languages natural to  them were similar to  human natural 
languages. 
by comparing the simple one-step translation of Figure 2 with the multiple-step 
process of Figure 1. A s  the 'Tmachine's natural language" becomes progressively 
more like human natural languages, this translation process becomes progressively 
simple r . 
The simplification resulting from such new machines may be illustrated 
23 
Natural Language @ "Machine's Natural Language'' 
Figure 2. Proposed translation for  non-conventional machines 
This alternative solution thus involves building machines which a re  in some sense 
"linguistically equivalent" to humans. It would permit a human to communicate with 
the machine with little or  no special training, thus making maximal use of the exten- 
sive training the human already has in a language, and opening up the communication 
channel with the machine to a wider user population. The computer may thus become 
a potential tool to people who are not interested in learning its mode of operation, its 
mechanical idiosyncrasies, and its particular details of structure. 
However, the big question remains: How can such machines be designed and built? 
No answer is immediately forthcoming, but it appears that the successful development 
of such "natural-language computers" would be helped by extensive linguistic analysis 
of natural languages, formal linguistics studies, studies in artificially intelligent 
and machines [ref. 261 , and general communication studies. Thus, 
it may be that construction of machines built around the primitives and structures of 
natural human languages wil l  have to wait until more complete models of natural 
languages and the communication process are developed (e. g., ref. 49, p.  118). Per- 
haps. Perhaps not, This would be a question of when __ to have non-Boolean machines with 
such structures, not a question ofwhy -- unless, of course, we consider the possi- 
bility that an adequate model of natural language is not forthcoming i n 3  future, 
foreseeable or not. 
ing needed non-Boolean machines, which will be considered in section VII. ) 
(This relates to the question of the likelihood of success in build- 
The point of the present argument is why have such non-Boolean machines. The 
arguments given in this section may be summed up as follows. Efficient, effective 
communication is facilitated by "higher level'' languages in contrast to numerical 
machine coding. Also, humans use natural languages machines do not, and it is 
probably better for flexible man-machine communication and work-load sharing if the 
machine adjusts more than the man. The use of non-Boolean machines with natural- 
language-like structures would also eliminate the need for the present multiple- step, 
man-machine translation processes. These arguments, coupled with other justi- 
fications for natural language programming, strongly favor the development of such 
non- Boolean machines. 
Thus, the generally acknowledged need for machine structures and languages 
which are suitable for natural-language man-computer communication favors the devel- 
opment of non-Boolean machines. 
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VI. THE ARGUMENT FROM COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMIES 
In at least one sense all arguments favoring non-conventional machine structures 
could be stated as being based on either ultimate capabilities of machines or  else 
some form of economies. Either a machine is capable (in the ultimate sense) of solving 
a problem o r  it is not. If it is not, then any need to solve such problems requires 
the development and use of other machines. However, if  it is capable, there still 
may be justification for rejecting its use if it is uneconomical o r  inefficient, o r  if it 
does not provide solutions when needed and in appropriate form, and so forth. If 
machine A is more economical, efficient, "cost-effective, 
machine B i s ,  practical motivation exists for selecting machine A over machine B. 
This may, in  fact, be the case with certain %on-Boolean" machines in preference 
to their conventional machine counterparts. 
or easy to  use, than 
Thus, just because a digital computer - can do almost anything doesn't mean it 
should. 
bility. Pierce [ref. 1, pp. 300, 3051 and Shannon [ref. 1, p. 3081 have recognized 
and stressed this, as is evidenced by their arguments quoted in  section II of this 
paper. Von Neumann [ref. 31, pp. 5-61 also recognized that certain machine 
structures (e. g. , conventional analog and digital analyzers) were appropriate for 
some problems while not for others. 
Universality of capability does not imply universality of utility or applica- 
Studies of the efficient applicability of various machine types to certain problems 
continue to play a dominant role in the development and justification of new machines 
and in the optimization of problem solutions [refs. 51, 52, 53, 541.  For example, 
the editors of a general workshop on computer organizations have concluded that 
speed of operation (as a measure of computational economy) is the basic justification 
for new machine types: 
"Admittedly it is a r a re  job that cannot be performed on the common serial type 
computer but the price to be paid in terms of equipment and programming to 
perform operations in a reasonable time is in many cases tremendous. This 
leads us  to the conclusion that the basic justification for new computer organiza- 
tions is the same as the original motive for the von Neumann computer--speed of 
operation [ref. 55, p. iv].!~ 
It is beyond the scope of this  paper to discuss the many detailed arguments which 
could be (and, in many cases, have been. presented justifying the use of specific 
machine structures for selected classes of problems. The number of computer 
operations required to solve a specific problem, the computation time, the required 
memory capacity, the cost of computer time, the cost of equipment, utilization of 
mass production economies, the time and cost of programming, difficulty of under- 
standing machine operation, enhancement of computational capabilities, and a myriad 
of other cri teria may be considered in  such studies. Recently, in particular, some 
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such economic criteria have been discussed as justification for various parallel- 
processing computers [refs.42, 51, 52, 551. 
frequently a r e  shown to justify new, non-conventional machine structures. 
In general, such economic arguments 
It is interesting to note that this adjustment of machine structure to best match 
the problems being tackled generally results in special-purpose computers, in 
contrast to general-purpose "universal'' machines. There is nothing inherently bad 
about such specialization, particularly in the light of the potential economic savings, 
but it is expected that many computer researchers will consider such a trend (toward 
special-purpose computers) as a retrogression in computer design. This need not 
be considered to  be the case. It may turn out that having a number of special-purpose 
computers t o  solve several types of problems may, with modern technology, be more 
economical and advantageous than having a single general-purpose machine. 
More importantly, it appears possible that universal machines can be built with 
entirely new structures (e. g. , like Holland's iterative circuit computers) which could 
be more economical, in the overall sense, for handling most o r  all of the problems 
presently handled by digital computers. Thus, given two universal machines, such 
as the conventional general-purpose digital computer and a new 'lnon-Boolean'l mach- 
ine of universal capability, one may, in the general sense, be more economical than 
the other. 
Many researchers,  including this author, believe that, considering the vast popu- 
lation of machine types possible, and the fact that present machines represent only a 
small portion of that population (and a portion which has resulted from the initial 
groping in the relatively new field of automatic computation), it is quite likely that 
new machine types, yet to be discovered and built, may turn out to be far more 
economical, efficient, and effective than present machines. This justifies the 
systematic search for new machine types, i. e . ,  for non-Boolean machines. 
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VII. THE ARGUMENT FROM LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
The previous arguments suggest ample justification for the development and use 
of non-conventional machine organizations. But to the practical-minded investigator 
such arguments favoring new structures would not be enough without some hope for 
being able to successfully design and implement these ideals into working systems. 
favors non-Boolean machines because of the definite potential for successful develop- 
I 
! 
The argument from the likelihoodof success, as it will be presented in this section, 
ment of new types of computer structures. 
' 
I 
In a weak sense, "non-Boolean" machines of some types have already been pro- 
posed, designed, and, in some cases, implemented. Machines which do not f i t  the 
pattern of the conventional digital computer include such types as analog analyzers, 
hybrid computers, parallel computers and iterative circuit computers (such as 
Holland's machines [ref. 521, SOLOMON machines [ref. 421, and ATHENE computers 
[ref. 561 ), McCormick's pattern recognition machines [ref. 541 
variable structure machines [ref. 511, and so forth. To varying degrees, these 
different machines exhibit definite differences from the structure and mode of opera- 
tion of conventional digital computers. The conception, design, implementation, 
and even the programming and practical use of these machines have proven to be not so 
formidable problems as was originally expected. A vast number of devices utilizing 
advanced techniques of microminaturization, batch fabricating techniques, and the 
like, are now available. Indeed, it appears that Shannon's prediction [ref. 1, p. 31q 
that we will have the necessary hardware (and, to some extent, software) to implement 
theoretical conceptions of new machine types is being fulfilled. 
PERCEPTRONS, 
However, to solve-the intriguing problems of language translation, information 
retrieval, pattern recognition, game playing, theorem proving, and so forth, and 
to design "a computer whose natural operation is  in terms of patterns, concepts, 
and vague similarities [ref. 1, p. 310],"drastic mutations in machine structure 
will apparently be needed. Such drastic changes will involve such concepts as: 
the "diffused function" operation mentioned by Shannon [ref. 1 ,  pp. 309-3101 and 
called for in section rV of this paper; the very general, real-time computation capa- 
bility discussed in section III; the structural correspondence with biological counter- 
parts discussed in section N; and the natural-language, linguistically intelligent 
machines proposed in section V. Admittedly, these concepts require new insights, 
a better understanding of human information processing, and better models of cogni- 
tive processing, real-time computation, and natural languages. The question then is 
whether reasonably adequate models and insights are forthcoming, in either the near 
future, the distant future, or ever. There are no known ultimate theoretical 
barr iers  to  achieving such models, and the rapid advances within cybernetics, 
linguistics, and computation theory in the past few decades show great promise for 
the successful development of adequate models and consequent machines in the fore- 
seeable future. 
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As only one example of recent developments which may provide the needed tech- 
nology for the implementation of new machine types, consider the potential of "domain 
tip propagation logic (DTPL) [ref. 571 .It DTPL is a new thin-film technique for obtain- 
ing all-magnetic logic and memory. Information is stored in domains of reversed 
magnetization within controlled regions of low coercive force channels imbedded in 
a thin-film element of generally high coercive force. Propagation of such information- 
storing domains occurs at the domain tips, and is controlled by applied magnetic 
fields, resulting in microminiature high-bit-density storage and logic. It has been 
observed that: 
"The speed and directionality of propagation and the stray field strength of domain 
tips suggested that this mode of domain growth, properly controlled, is adaptable 
to a great variety of logical operations of a new and yet unexploited nature [ref. 57, 
p. 348]." 
and that certain characteristics of DTPL "can lead to an enormous variety of possible 
device operations [ref. 57, p. 3501 ." Thus this new technique not only provides high 
storage and logic densities, good use of batch fabricating, and all-magnetic logic, 
it also shows a wide potential for new logic devices. 
In particular, the effects involved in DTPL permit digital and some analog opera- 
tions, some threshold effects, an apparent similarity between the propagation of 
domain t ips  and the propagation of nerve pulses in neural nets, interconnections 
between DTPL logic elements which are of the same material as the elements them- 
selves, relatively slow domain tip propagation and potentially long-duration, minute- 
size delay units and shift registers. All  these features are directly pertinent to 
bionic models which would use principles of biological counterparts to aid develop- 
ment of successful new machines. 
The net result of the comments in this section is to display significant potential 
for achieving successful design and implementation of non-Boolean machines. When 
coupled with the previous arguments from experts in computation, ultimate capabili- 
ties, biological counterparts, natural-language programming, and computational 
economies, this potential for success encourages one to carefully consider the 
development of non-Boolean machines. 
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